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Abstract 
While there have been regular debates on corporate tax avoidance, a distinguishing feature of the 
current interest is the involvement of a wider audience which includes society in general. By 
analysing both tax related disclosures in company annual reports and corporate social responsibility 
reports the authors examine how managers of companies who have been subject to specific criticism 
of their alleged tax avoidance respond to such criticism. Using a legitimacy theory framework to 
identify four disclosure themes: explicit tax philosophy, implicit tax philosophy, tax conduct and tax 
contribution, companies’ reports for the 11 year period 2004–2005 to 2014–2015 have been analysed. 
The authors have found what appears to be evidence of inconsistency on the part of managers in 
identifying appropriate responses which the authors attribute to uncertainty as to the status of tax 
avoidance. The uncertainty is apparent in variation over time both within companies and between 
companies and is reflected in the incidence of disclosures, their content, and in some cases the 
absence of a disclosure. This uncertainty is most probably part of a wider reluctance to respond 
directly to the criticism or to enter into debate and reflects societal ambiguity as regards the 
legitimacy of tax avoidance. The authors conclude that governments cannot rely on managerial 
attitudes or voluntary frameworks if they wish to change the behaviour of managers in relation both 
to tax avoidance or to tax more widely.  
 Introduction  
The taxation of companies and in particular the taxation of corporate profits is currently subject to 
unprecedented scrutiny. While there has always been debate1 traditionally it has been confined within 
the tax profession and business community. A distinguishing feature of the current interest is the 
involvement of a broader audience including, in particular, wider society.2,3 News items on taxation 
policy and the tax affairs of individual companies appear  regularly across a wide spectrum of 
newspapers and other media.4  
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While a trend of increasing scrutiny predates the banking crisis of 2007–2008, arguably the 
crisis and the resulting fiscal and societal responses added impetus to demands for greater scrutiny. 
More recently national and intra-national regulatory and supervisory bodies have argued the need for 
increased disclosure surrounding companies’ tax status. Two contrasting approaches are evident. The 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) recommendations on increased disclosure envisage private 
disclosures between companies and specific tax administrations to assist tax authorities both in 
administering existing tax laws more efficiently and effectively and in responding in a more timely 
manner to developments.5 In contrast, under proposals contained in the Finance Bill 2016 (FB 2016) 
HMRC6 would require large companies to publish their UK tax strategy. Similarly, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC)7 has recently called for increased tax disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports. The FRC’s concerns relate to shareholders’ being able to assess companies’ future tax 
liabilities and tax risks while in contrast the FB 2016 provisions are designed to change behaviour 
around “tax planning”.  
 The extent to which public disclosure can change behaviour depends to a great extent on 
societal attitudes and managers’ perceptions of societal attitudes. Although by definition tax 
avoidance constitutes a legal means of planning, various groups within society are challenging the 
social acceptability or legitimacy of tax avoidance. For example, in the UK recent criticism in the 
press8 and direct action9 against specific companies alleged to have avoided tax suggests changing 
attitudes within parts of society towards the “legitimacy” of tax avoidance. NGOs such as Christian 
Aid, Oxfam and Save the Children have criticised tax avoidance more broadly. 
In this article the authors examine how managers of companies subject to specific criticism 
respond to such criticism by analysing tax related disclosures in the companies’ annual reports (ARs) 
and corporate social responsibility reports (CSSRs). The reports for the 11 year period 2004–2005 to 
2014–2015 are analysed using a legitimacy theory framework.10 The attitudes of these managers to 
public criticism of tax avoidance together with whether or not there is a likelihood of there being any 
voluntary change in their behaviour is, arguably, revealed by the nature of their responses.11 Further a 
willingness or otherwise on the part of these managers to enter into a dialogue may provide an 
indication of the usefulness of mandatory disclosure of companies’ tax strategy under the FB 2016 
proposals.12  
In “combating” tax avoidance HMRC refers to its “relentless” pursuit of taxpayers, the 
resulting risk to taxpayers “of having their tax avoidance exposed to public scrutiny …”13 and any 
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concern “that your reputation and career will be damaged when it becomes known that you are a tax 
avoider”.14  Such efforts by HMRC and other tax administrations are only effective in changing 
corporate behaviour if managers perceive that public scrutiny would result in a loss of corporate 
legitimacy. The academic literature on societal attitudes to tax avoidance is limited and in the context 
of corporate social responsibility has generally been overlooked.15,16 However, the legitimacy of tax 
avoidance has been examined in the context of the rights and responsibilities of companies,17,18 
although such examinations do not produce universally accepted conclusions. Similarly there is 
conflicting evidence on whether managers and stakeholders perceive there to be any reputational risks 
associated with tax avoidance.19,20,21,22,23,24,25 While this lack of consensus may in part reflect cultural 
variation between the countries examined 26  documentary evidence illustrates variations in the 
attitudes of managers within a single country, specifically the UK. A stark example of contrasting 
responses is provided by Google and Starbucks following UK Parliamentary criticisms of their tax 
conduct.27 Starbucks responded through a series of newspaper advertisements by announcing it would 
pay “a significant amount of tax during 2013 and 2014 regardless of whether the company is 
profitable during these years”.28 Meanwhile Google’s Chairman Eric Schmidt was quoted as being 
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“proud” of the company’s tax structure and summed up the company’s attitude to tax avoidance as 
“It’s called capitalism.”.29  
Legitimacy theory posits that an organisation’s ability to operate as desired by its managers or, 
in the extreme, to continue in existence, is conditional on that organisation being perceived as 
legitimate by key evaluating actors. 30  Achieving legitimacy is necessary for an organisation to 
maintain its social licence to continue.31 Organisational legitimacy is an important means by which 
stakeholders can attempt to exercise control over an organisation.32 In the face of a challenge or a 
threat to an organisation’s legitimacy, legitimacy theory posits that managers can avail themselves of 
a range of potential strategies when attempting to maintain legitimacy. These responses range from 
accepting the criticism as valid and agreeing to conform to expectations to challenging the validity of 
the criticism. Within these two positions, managers can attempt to defuse the criticism by bringing 
about a reassessment of their actions or a change in societal expectations as to what is appropriate 
behaviour.33 These strategies involve managers disclosing information.34 A further (non) response is 
to ignore the threat for fear of legitimising it. In deciding whether and how to respond managers 
reveal their attitudes to or perceptions of the legitimacy of tax avoidance. The authors use legitimacy 
theory to identify four disclosure themes linked to organisational legitimacy in the tax avoidance 
setting, namely “explicit tax philosophy”, “implicit tax philosophy”, “tax conduct” and “tax 
contribution” themed disclosures. The authors identify such themed disclosures and interpret their 
underlying strategy or motivation, that is, acceptance or rejection.  
The authors’ results can be summarised as follows. Consistent with a fear of legitimising the 
expressed concerns35 managers generally appear wary of responding to criticism of tax avoidance. 
While the authors find a general increase in disclosures over the 11 year period examined, managers 
reveal an unwillingness to either engage in a debate by challenging the criticism or to confirm their 
acceptance. This increase in disclosures is consistent with the general observation that managers 
interpret criticism of tax avoidance as legitimacy threatening. However, behind this general 
observation there is wide variation both between companies and within companies over time. This 
suggests uncertainty among managers in identifying both the validity of the criticism and the 
appropriate legitimising strategy. These company specific responses suggest that responses to policy 
initiatives designed to reduce tax avoidance may not be universally successful. For example, increased 
tax related disclosures are by themselves unlikely to change tax decisions made by all managers. 
There is no universal acceptance of the status of tax avoidance either across companies or over time.  
Managers recognise the threat but their responses suggest they do not accept its validity or that it is 
persuasive in changing their explicitly stated tax behaviour.    
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: section 2 discusses organisational 
legitimacy; section 3 provides a discussion of tax avoidance in the context of legitimacy theory; 
section 4 considers tax avoidance in the UK to provide context to the subsequent analysis; section 5 
explains the research questions and research method; section 6 summarises the results; and section 7 
discusses and concludes the article.  
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Organisational legitimacy  
Organisational legitimacy is an important means by which stakeholders can attempt to 
exercise control over an organisation.36 An organisation’s ability to operate, that is, a social licence,37 
as desired by its managers or, in the extreme, to continue in existence, is conditional on its ability to 
be perceived as legitimate by key evaluating actors.38 Various definitions of organisational legitimacy 
exist39 ranging  across a number of dimensions, for example, the identity of the evaluating audience or 
the features of the organisation being evaluated.40 The authors adopt Suchman’s41 broad definition of 
legitimacy to delineate the concept and then examine the specific dimensions or components of 
legitimacy that combine to provide an overall perception of legitimacy.      
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions.”42 
An important feature of the Suchman definition is the breadth of potential evaluating 
audiences which are accommodated.43 In contrast when only a specialist aspect of an organisation’s 
activities is under scrutiny, the resulting audience may reflect only a narrow “system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions”.44 The importance of legitimacy to an organisation depends on its public 
visibility and the extent to which its survival is reliant on social and political support.45 Organisations 
can attempt to manage legitimacy strategically in three settings: gaining legitimacy, maintaining 
legitimacy or defending/repairing legitimacy.46,47,48 
The literature has identified specific legitimacy types; these are constructed around either the 
identity of the evaluating audience, for example, regulatory legitimacy or features of the 
organisation’s activities.49 Focusing on the latter, based on Aldrich and Fiol,50 Suchman51 and Scott52 
three broadly similar components of an organisation’s legitimacy are developed. These comprise 
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy and are derived from the assessments of key stakeholders’ 
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of the benefits that flow from an organisation.53 Pragmatic and moral legitimacy can be differentiated 
with respect to the breadth of the diffusion of the benefit or the effects considered by the evaluating 
audience in its assessments.54 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on an evaluation of the benefits to an immediate audience from 
its direct exchanges with an organisation. Moral legitimacy takes a wider or sociotropic perspective of 
an organisation’s effects on the evaluator’s social group or society as a whole. It moves beyond 
considering the evaluator’s self-interest. Suchman55 identified four organisational features that can be 
used in evaluating an organisation’s moral legitimacy. Procedural and consequential legitimacy rely 
on assessments of the social acceptance of an organisation’s behaviour (means) and goals (ends). In 
contrast structural and personal legitimacy centre on the form within which the organisation operates. 
Structural characteristics can include organisational form, for example, presence or absence of 
specific functions. Personal legitimacy derives from the personal characteristics of individuals within 
the organisation.56 An evaluation of pragmatic or moral legitimacy involves an explicit assessment 
whereas cognitive legitimacy is characterised by an absence of questioning, legitimacy is taken for 
granted.57 The organisation is accepted as being proper and desirable.58 
Against a backdrop of increasing public criticism of tax avoidance the authors examine 
managers’ decisions in the context of defending/repairing legitimacy. The legitimacy of an 
organisation is threatened when an evaluating audience perceives a significant divergence or “gap” 
between its expectations and an organisation’s performance.59  In response managers must judge 
whether the evaluating audience has the ability to confer, or in effect threaten, its legitimacy.60 
Managers may decide to ignore a threat if they consider the evaluating audience not to be sufficiently 
influential and/or that responding could add credibility to the evaluating audience or to the nature of 
the threat.61 Fear of “legitimising” a threat is particularly relevant within the tax avoidance setting as, 
arguably, criticism is emerging as a result of a gradual change in social attitudes and not in response 
to changes in organisational behaviour.62 The potential divergence of views on tax avoidance within 
society adds a further complication in formulating an appropriate response.  
Taxation related threats to legitimacy can differ qualitatively from other threats, for example, 
environmental. Under International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes63 managers are required to 
make quantitative taxation based disclosures on a regular basis irrespective of a company’s approach 
to tax avoidance. Taxation is a continuous (annual) source of potential threat inviting stakeholders to 
compare the occurrence of disclosures and content over time and between companies. In responding 
to a discrete threat or to a potential threat managers may be sensitive to the risk of setting a disclosure 
precedent even though the disclosure could produce an immediate benefit. This can occur even when 
the content of the disclosure is considered not to be contentious in the current context.  
If managers decide to respond they can make either “substantive changes”, “symbolic 
changes” or a combination of both.64,65,66,67 To conform to societal expectations managers can make 
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substantive changes in an organisation’s behaviour or “goals, structures or process”; these are referred 
to as “Conforming” disclosures.68 A hypothetical example of a conforming disclosure is a company 
announcing that “it does not avoid corporate taxes”. In the disclosure the company is confirming its 
practices are congruent with those who hold that tax avoidance is an inappropriate or illegitimate 
activity. If managers consider that their current tax policies do meet societal expectations but that 
society is incorrectly interpreting their company policies the managers can make disclosures designed 
to cause a reassessment of current behaviour. The authors describe such disclosure as “influencing”. 
A hypothetical example of an influencing disclosure is where a company states that it currently pays 
an “appropriate” amount of corporate income tax. By emphasising the consequences of its tax policy 
the company is attempting to influence societal assessments of its current behaviour. Alternatively, 
managers may consider that societal expectations are incorrect or inappropriate and respond by 
making disclosures which challenge, either explicitly or implicitly, societal expectations of what is an 
appropriate tax policy. These disclosures are termed “challenging”69  and would to company tax 
policies which explicitly or implicitly challenges the view of tax avoidance being illegitimate. A 
hypothetical example would be a disclosure that the company’s strategy is to maximise returns for 
shareholders without any further reference to the other stakeholders. While a company’s behaviour 
remains unchanged under both influencing and challenging disclosures the aims of the disclosures are 
to induce substantive changes in societal assessments or societal expectations respectively.  
Finally, managers may attempt to manipulate societal assessments by making disclosures 
which draw attention away from the contested practice without any associated change in behaviour. 
This third option involves identifying behaviour with popular perceptions of what is appropriate 
without an associated attempt to conform. 70  Such disclosures are described as “deflecting”. 71  A 
hypothetical example of a deflecting disclosure would be a company disclosing that discussions have 
taken place with a tax based NGO without commenting on any resulting policy change.  
To summarise, the four types of disclosure predicted by legitimacy theory are: “conforming”; 
“challenging”; “influencing” and “deflecting”. Managers may of course decide, as discussed above, to 
ignore the legitimacy threat in which case no disclosure would result. The authors use these potential 
disclosure/non-disclosure strategies to analyse tax disclosures. 
   
The legitimacy of tax avoidance  
Attitudes to tax avoidance are varied and reflect in part different philosophical stances (R.S. 
Avi-Yonah (2006), 72  J. Freedman, G. Loomer and J. Vella (2009), 73  M. Gammie (2013), 74  J. 
Hasseldine and G. Morris (2013),75 P. Sikka (2013),76 M. Ylönen and M. Laine (2014)77). While 
proponents stress the benefits of tax avoidance, critics warn of its adverse consequences and others 
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claim assessments of benefits and costs are irrelevant as managers have a fiduciary duty to avoid 
taxes.78 Tax avoidance can be examined on legal and philosophical grounds though neither approach 
provides a commonly acceptable conclusion as to its morality. This ambiguity creates uncertainty for 
managers as to how to respond. Within a legal framework a distinction can be drawn between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion. However, this distinction may be too broad to assist managers in 
considering the legitimacy of tax avoidance. Arguing that tax avoidance activities are acceptable or 
justifiable because by definition they are legal ignores two factors. First, tax administrations are 
attempting to blur the distinction between avoidance and evasion with the use of terms such as 
aggressive avoidance79,80 and unacceptable avoidance.81,82 The latest HMRC Tax Gap estimate goes 
further and redefines tax avoidance as “… bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax advantage 
that Parliament never intended”.83 Outside of tax administrations it is also recognised that certain 
practices, while complying with the law, are undesirable from a policy perspective and warrant 
corrective action.84 Secondly, the legitimacy of a tax avoidance practice may depend on its legal 
success. A failed attempt at tax avoidance or “ineffective avoidance”85 may result because it was 
deemed ineffective on the grounds of being contrived.86 Hence unsuccessful attempts at tax avoidance 
may suggest excessive zeal on the part of the company thereby inviting criticism. The “traditional” 
distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion may not therefore represent the perspective of all 
evaluating audiences.  
Alternatively, tax avoidance can be examined from a philosophical perspective by examining 
the rights and responsibilities of companies. 87 , 88  The determination of corporate rights and 
responsibilities follows on from how companies are viewed.89 If companies are seen as owing their 
existence to the state, that is, the “artificial entity” view, taxation can be interpreted as a reciprocal 
payment for the benefits of incorporation conferred by the state. Consequently, companies have a 
moral obligation to pay an “appropriate” amount of taxation as judged by society.90 In contrast, the 
“real entity” view posits that companies have a personality or existence distinct from both the state 
and their owners. Consequently companies are in the same position as individual tax payers with the 
same obligation to pay the legally required amount of taxation.91 In determining what the legally 
required amount to pay is, companies can choose either to interpret tax law literally or by reference to 
the intention of parliament. Finally, under the “aggregate” or “nexus of contacts” view of companies, 
a company is viewed as being under the control of its shareholders and, according to neo-classical 
economic theory, should be guided by profit maximisation in all of its decisions including those 
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concerning tax.92 By implication the company owes no duty to pay any more tax than is legally 
required.  
Empirical studies on attitudes to tax avoidance fail to provide a consensus on how tax 
avoidance is viewed in terms of its legitimacy. Lanis and Richardson93  found that managers of 
companies who had been publicly linked to tax avoidance perceived it as a threat to their companies’ 
legitimacy. In contrast both Freedman, Loomer and Vella94 and Graham, Hanlon and Shevlin,95 in 
interviews of managers of UK- and US-based companies respectively, reported variation among 
managers as regards whether they perceived tax avoidance as carrying significant corporate 
reputational risk. Taking into account a broader range of groups, Davis, Guenther, Krull and 
Williams96 concluded “that managers and other stakeholders of [US] firms for which CA [corporate 
accountability] reporting is important do not view the payment of corporate taxes as socially 
responsible”. Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock,97 in a study of US firms publicly identified as 
participants in tax shelters, examined a wide range of potential indicators of reputational costs, for 
example, CEO and CFO turnover, auditor turnover, lost sales, increased advertising costs and 
decreased media reputation. They concluded, “We find no consistent evidence that firms or their top 
executives bear significant reputational costs as a result of being accused of engaging in tax shelter 
activities.” In contrast, Hanlon and Slemrod98 found reductions in share prices for a sample of US 
firms linked publicly to participation in “tax sheltering” activity. The reductions varied by industry in 
line with the companies’ salience amongst final consumers. Differences in attitudes between 
managers in different countries may reflect variations in cultural norms. For example, to the extent 
that national legal systems reflect cultural norms, Australia, the US and the UK differ significantly 
with respect to legislative responses to avoidance and in particular the introduction of a general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR).99   
 
Corporate tax avoidance in UK context 
Societal attitudes to tax avoidance have changed significantly in recent years100,101). Morrell 
and Tuck102 describe the period 2001–2007 as pivotal in the governance of corporate taxation in the 
UK with two important policy documents published by HMRC, Tax in the Boardroom Agenda 
(HMRC, 2006a)103 and Working with Large Business (HMRC, 2006b).104 These reflect a change in 
HMRC’s attitudes to corporate tax avoidance and consequential administrative responses. In parallel, 
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tax advisers perceived a hardening in HMRC’s attitude in dealing with companies.105 Freedman106 
observed that press coverage of corporate taxation supported the perception of a “culture of tax 
avoidance”—a perception that persists.107 
Subsequently, and possibly in response to the ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis, 
societal attention turned to the tax behaviour of individual companies. During February 2009 under 
the heading Tax Gap the Guardian newspaper published a series of articles examining what it 
described as tax avoidance.108 The nature of the specific criticisms against named companies in the 
articles varied: suggestion of participation in a particular tax avoiding transaction (Barclays plc, 
Diageo plc, Lloyds Banking Group plc (Lloyds plc) and Tesco plc109), not publishing a full list of 
subsidiaries (HSBC plc), acting as a “co-operating” bank in relation to another company’s transaction 
(Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS plc)) and using “legal challenges” to “pay less tax” (Vodafone plc).  
In March 2009 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that HMRC would publish a 
“Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks” (The Code). The Government justified its focus on the 
banking sector by claiming it had been more aggressive than other sectors in promoting tax avoidance. 
At a time when the sector had received more Government help than other industries, the public 
expected a “high degree of responsibility”.110 
On 20 October 2010 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced reductions in public 
spending described as “dramatic austerity measures”.111 Almost immediately a new pressure group, 
UK Uncut, was formed and on 27 October 2010 undertook its first direct action.112 Approximately 70 
protestors occupied a Vodafone shop in Oxford Street, London. The first press coverage of the 
occupation was on 30 October 2010113 with subsequent coverage by the Guardian on 5 November  
2010.  UK Uncut then expanded the number of companies or “targets” for “direct action” to 11 
including seven UK quoted companies.114  These seven companies had also been included in the 
earlier Guardian Tax Gap series. UK Uncut criticised four of the quoted companies for their 
involvement in what it described as tax avoidance activities (Diageo plc, HSBC plc, Tesco plc and 
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Vodafone plc) and three other quoted companies (Barclays plc, Lloyds plc and RBS plc) were 
criticised for their apparent “bonus culture”. While neither the Guardian nor UK Uncut questioned the 
legality of the companies’ tax policies both linked the policies to a resulting failure to pay what was 
described as a “fair share of tax”. The criticism was levied at what was considered to be the “morality” 
of the companies’ tax policies. Although the concept of a “fair share” is impossible to determine by 
law the wider effect of the criticism was to establish the concept as credible amongst a wide public. 
UK Uncut’s actions in occupying and picketing the companies’ business premises received 
extensive media coverage. In the three month period following UK Uncut’s inception, Nexis reports 
182 newspaper articles referring to UK Uncut in mainstream UK newspapers with further coverage in 
specialist press.115 By taking publicly observable direct action UK Uncut ensured its concerns reached 
a broader audience. In contrast to earlier criticism of corporate tax avoidance by the Guardian 
newspaper, UK Uncut’s actions represented a more significant threat because of its wider coverage 
among companies’ stakeholders including customers. A “senior executive” of a UK quoted company 
stated:   
“This is the most difficult communications issue I have ever faced. Tax is a very complex 
issue but these protesters [UK Uncut] – egged on by some parts of the media – are reducing it 
all to a few black and white slogans using information which in some cases is entirely 
wrong.”116 
Similarly, in assessing UK Uncut’s actions against the banks Shaheen,117  writing in the journal 
International Tax Review, concluded: 
“But for the first time it is not just the hands of the tax authorities that banks have to contend 
with, but the eyes of the public for whom tax avoidance, evasion and planning have suddenly 
become dirty words.”118 
Clearly within the UK attitudes to corporate tax avoidance were forming and changing during the 
2000s. Managers of companies specifically criticised together with those of other companies were 
faced with an emerging threat to corporate legitimacy. Without a consensus as to whether tax 
avoidance represents a “reprehensible act”119 managers lacked guidance and experience as regards the 
selection of an appropriate response or non-response.  
 
Research propositions and method 
The authors examine tax related disclosures in (Financial) ARs and CSRRs made by the 
seven quoted companies that featured in both the Guardian series and UK Uncut’s direct action. The 




The forgoing discussion highlights changes in societal attitudes and a lack of unambiguous 
guidance on the legitimacy of tax avoidance from both legal and philosophical reasoning and HMRC 
administrative guidance. Tax avoidance and its relation to corporate social responsibility is a 
contested area.120 Santana121 argues that tax avoidance can fall in the “grey zone” between legitimate 
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and illegitimate claims as perceived by management. Managers may reasonably query whether tax 
avoidance represents a “reprehensible act” threatening their companies’ legitimacy. 122   As an 
emerging and evolving threat managers’ perceptions of societal expectation may vary both 
individually and over time.123 ,124  Against this background of uncertainty managers lack external 
guidance in deciding upon what is an appropriate response or non-response.  
To provide insights into managerial attitudes to the legitimacy of tax avoidance and how 
managers perceive the validity of related societal criticism, the authors examine incidences of tax 
related disclosures. Five propositions relating to disclosure practice are examined. First, an increasing 
incidence of tax disclosures over time would indicate recognition by managers that societal criticism 
of tax avoidance is potentially damaging to companies’ legitimacy (Proposition 1). This proposition 
does imply that managers consider the criticism to be valid; the authors examine this in Propositions 4 
and 5. Secondly, the authors would expect there to be variation between companies in disclosure 
practice indicative of uncertainty over the legitimacy status of tax avoidance (Proposition 2). Thirdly, 
over time the authors would expect company specific responses to be revised in the light of perceived 
changes in societal attitudes, changes in managers’ attitudes to tax avoidance and continuing 
uncertainty (Proposition 3). These three propositions consider merely the presence or absence of 
disclosures. The fourth and fifth propositions examine the content or strategy of the disclosures using 
the categories identified earlier, that is: conforming; challenging; and influencing.125 The authors 
expect to observe variation between companies (Proposition 4) and variation over time within 
companies (Proposition 5) consistent with the reasoning given for Propositions 2 and 3 above.  
 
Research method 
The authors examine the tax related disclosures of the seven quoted companies identified by 
both the Guardian and UK Uncut as discussed in section 4, above. Table 1 summarises the specific 
criticisms levied against each company by the two organisations. 
 
Table 1: specific criticism by The Guardian newspaper Tax Gap series and UK Uncut 
targeting126 
Company The Guardian 
   
UK Uncut 
Barclays   Specific tax avoidance transaction Operating a “bonus culture” 
 
Diageo  Specific tax avoidance transaction Involvement in tax avoidance 
  
HSBC Published “Incomplete list of subsidiaries” Involvement in tax avoidance 
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Lloyds   Specific tax avoidance transaction 
 
Operating a “bonus culture” 
 
RBS  “Cooperating Bank” in a tax avoidance 
transactions 
Operating a “bonus culture” 
 
Tesco  Specific tax avoidance transaction Involvement in tax avoidance 
 




Each company was subject to criticism of potential involvement in tax avoidance by at least 
either the Guardian or UK Uncut. Focusing on the seven publicly quoted companies provides a 
discrete sample of companies that have been subject to a highly visible and widely reported criticism 
which has the potential to threaten their legitimacy as defined above.127,128 The extent of comment by 
influential media is an important indicator of the validity of societal criticism and provides an 
indication of the legitimacy of the particular threat.129 
The sample frame is the 11 year period 2004–2005 to 2014–2015 during which period 
societal attitudes towards tax avoidance have arguably changed. The authors analyse each company’s 
ARs and CSRRs.130 These sources are under the editorial control of the companies  and are, therefore, 
a likely forum for disclosure.131,132,133  
The authors examine only tax related disclosures thereby providing a focused analysis.134 
While the general literature on legitimacy and disclosures finds evidence of increases in general 
voluntary disclosures in response to specific legitimacy threats as a way of deflecting criticism, for 
example Lanis and Richardson,135 the approach adopted in analysing only specific disclosures avoids 
problems of attribution and aggregation inherent in a multifaceted assessment.136 Though there is a 
risk this approach fails to capture associated non-tax compensating or deflecting strategy disclosures, 
O’Donovan137 and Deegan, Rankin and Tobin138 report correspondence between the specific aspects 
of a company under criticism and those aspects which record increases in disclosure level, that is, 
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companies appear to respond to specific criticism with disclosures relating to the area subject to 
criticism.  
All occurrences of the word “tax(ation)” in the companies’ ARs and CSRRs were identified 
by one of the authors using the Adobe Reader search function. The same author then reviewed all 
occurrences in order to identify and remove from further analysis incidental references where tax 
considerations were not under consideration.139 The same author performed this function for all ARs 
and CSRRs to maximise consistency. Entire ARs were analysed because in addition to mandatory 
disclosures under IAS 12 Income Taxes,140 there is the potential for disclosures elsewhere in ARs, for 
example, in the Operating and Financial Report, the Directors’ Report and the Corporate Governance 
Report, etc. Then two of the authors, working independently of each other, coded the extracts.141 The 
coding was performed after all the data had been extracted to ensure extraction was not influenced by 
the coding process itself.142 
A directed or deductive thematic content analysis was employed.143,144,145,146 The authors 
recognise disclosures may not fully encapsulate managers’ attitudes and tax strategies thereby 
hindering comparison between companies. The authors attempt to mitigate these concerns by also 
examining changes within individual companies over time holding constant any company specific 
idiosyncratic disclosure practices. 
As discussed above criticism of a company’s tax avoidance can be viewed as a threat to the 
company’s moral legitimacy and, more specifically, its procedural legitimacy and consequential 
legitimacy. Linked to procedural and consequential legitimacy, the authors posit three tax related 
themes along which managers could respond to criticism; namely philosophy, conduct and 
contribution. Managers may appeal to procedural and consequential legitimacy by signalling their 
general philosophy on taxation. The signal could be explicit, for example: a reference to how tax 
legislation is interpreted by the managers, the influence of taxation considerations on their decision 
making, or a statement about the primacy of the interests of a particular stakeholder group over those 
of other groups with respect to taxation. Alternatively, the signal could be implicit. For example, 
managers may reveal their tax philosophy when describing other aspects of the company, for example, 
in making a reference to tax when either discussing non-audit services or the utilisation of tax losses. 
The authors separately identify explicit and implicit philosophy disclosures to capture the greater 
significance of explicit disclosures by avoiding their aggregation with implicit disclosures. The 
second theme, conduct disclosures, addresses procedural legitimacy. To demonstrate legitimacy 
managers may refer to the basis of their dealings with tax administrations and governments. The use 
of adjectives such as “transparent”, “open” and “compliant”, etc. can be used by managers to attempt 
to convey propriety and therefore legitimacy in tax matters. Conduct disclosures can be concerned 
with internal conduct, for example, governance over tax decision making or external conduct, for 
example, approaches adopted in dealing with tax administrations. The authors separately identify 
these two types of conduct disclosure as they are concerned with differing stages of procedural 
legitimacy. The third theme, contribution, is derived from consequential legitimacy. Managers may 
disclose the amount of taxation paid by a company in an attempt to imply compliant or socially 
                                                          
139
 Examples of incidental references included references to “pre-tax profits” and “post-tax profits” where tax 
was not under consideration. 
140
 IAS 12, above fn.63. 
141
 The same two authors coded all the ARs, CSRRs and press releases to maximise consistency. 
142
 H.F. Hsieh and S.E. Shannon, “Three approaches to qualitative content analysis” (2005) 15(9) Quality 
Health Research 1277. 
143
 W.J. Potter and D. Levine‐Donnerstein, “Rethinking validity and reliability in content analysis” (1999) 27(3) 
Journal of Applied Communication Research 258. 
144
 See Hsieh and Shannon, above fn.142. 
145
 V. Beattie and S.J. Thomson,  “Lifting the lid on the use of content analysis to investigate intellectual capital 
disclosures” (2007) 31(2) Accounting Forum 129. 
146
 R. Franzosi, “Content analysis: Objective, systematic, and quantitative description of content” in SAGE 
Benchmarks in Social Research Methods: Content Analysis (2008), 2–43. 
  
acceptable behaviour by highlighting the consequences of their taxation policies in terms of tax 
payments.  
The initial analysis of the various disclosures documents the occurrence of each type of theme: 
explicit philosophy, implicit philosophy, conduct and contribution. The second stage of analysis 
involves interpreting each identified disclosure to form a view as to its underlying motivation or 
strategy, that is, conforming, challenging or influencing. 147  For example an explicit philosophy 
disclosure could be made to either challenge or accept criticism of tax avoidance. The authors conduct 
this analysis for the explicit philosophy and implicit philosophy only.148  
To illustrate the themes and coding by strategy a series of examples are shown in Table 2.149 
In making an explicit philosophy disclosure Barclays plc has effectively confirmed its acceptance of 
the concept of a “fair share” in the context of responsibilities to stakeholders beyond shareholders (see 
Quote 1, Table 2). While the concept of a “fair share” is vague and undefined by Barclays plc it was 
used by the Guardian and UK Uncut as representing the converse of tax avoidance. The disclosure is 
interpreted as implying that the company does not avoid taxes, that it confirms agreement with the 
stated inappropriateness of tax avoidance. RBS plc’s explicit philosophy disclosure is interpreted as 
confirmatory because of its apparent emphasis on the primacy of non-tax consideration in its decision 
making (see Quote 2, Table 2). The statement however does not define the word “inappropriate” or 
from whose perspective an assessment of inappropriateness would be made. HSBC plc’s disclosure 
emphasises the tax requirements faced by the company but makes no mention of their effect on the 
company’s behaviour (See Quote 3, Table 2). 










“At Barclays, we are committed to meeting our 
responsibilities to stakeholders. These include … Pay 
our fair share of taxes to the revenue authorities.”  
 
Source: Group Chairman’s statement, page 8, 





“The Group will only enter into a commercial 
transaction or customer relationship which is legal and 
complies with regulatory requirements, has economic 
substance or business purpose and is not designed or 
used for inappropriate accounting or tax purposes.”   
 
Source: Business review, Risk, capital and liquidity 
management, page 173, The Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc Annual Report and Accounts, 2009.  
Confirmatory 
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“We are subject to the substance and interpretation of 
tax laws in all countries in which we operate. Failure 
to respond to changes in tax rates and comply with 
procedures required by tax authorities could lead to 
increased tax challenges, including financial or 
operating penalties.”  
 
Source: Report of the Directors: Operating and 
Financial Review, Risk, Challenges and uncertainties, 
page 88, HSBC Holdings plc Annual Report and 





“Our tax policy is straight forward: we pay taxes that 
are due in the countries where we make our profits or 
record capital gains in line with the prevailing 
legislation of those jurisdictions.”  
 
Source: Chairman’s statement, Tax policy, page 6, 





“The Group’s strategy is to maximise returns for 
shareholders whilst complying with relevant tax laws, 
disclosure requirements and regulations under an 
appropriate risk control framework.”  
 
Source: Risk management and governance, risk 
factors, 13, taxation risk, page 81, Barclays plc 





“We are committed to the effective, sustainable and 
active management of our tax affairs in support of 
outstanding business performance in the territories in 
which we operate and, as with all other aspects of our 
business, to maximise shareholder value.” 
 
Source: Strategic approach, Our business, Tax affairs 
page 6, Diageo plc Corporate Citizenship Report 
2010. 
Challenging 




“Deloitte LLP also provided advisory services in 
respect of corporate tax planning … .  to the Group 
during the year.” 
 
Source: Directors’ remuneration report, The 
Remuneration Committee, page 57Tesco PLC Annual 





“The most significant tax planning strategy is the 
investment of capital in our US operations to ensure 




Source: Report of the Directors: Operating and 
Financial Review, Financial summary, Critical 
accounting policies, Deferred tax assets, page 36, 
HSBC Holdings plc Annual Report and Accounts 2010 




“The risk of reputational damage, loss of investor 
confidence and/or financial loss arising from the 
adoption of inappropriate …… tax reporting, failure to 
manage the associated risks of challenges in taxation 
rates, ……. and the failure to disclose accurate 
information about the Group on a timely basis.”  
 
Source: Risk management – financial soundness, page 
102 Lloyds Banking Group Annual Report and 





“The Group takes a responsible and transparent 
approach to the management and control of its tax 
affairs and related tax risk, specifically: – tax risks are 
assessed as part of the Group’s formal governance 
processes and are reviewed by the Executive 
Committee, Group Finance Director and the Board 
Risk Committee ….” 
 
Source: Risk management and governance, taxation 
risk, page 85, Barclays plc Annual Report 2009. 
Influencing 




“Payment of taxes accounted for the largest slice of the 
added value that we generated this year. In addition to 
direct tax contribution, we pay local business taxes, 
our consumers pay excise taxes and sales taxes such as 
VAT and our employees and suppliers pay income and 
corporate taxes.”  
 
Source: Strategic approach - Our business - Tax 






“In 2010 we made global tax payments of £6,149m, 
made up of £3,138m of taxes borne by Barclays and 
£3,011m of taxes collected from others on behalf of 
governments, principally being employee income taxes 
which arise through Barclays’ economic activity. 
Barclays paid corporate income tax of £1,458m in 
2010.” 
 
Source: Contributing to Growth, Direct economic 





In the absence of an explicit reference similar to those made by Barclays plc and RBS plc 
above, HSBC plc’s disclosure implies neither a challenge to nor a confirmation of the 
inappropriateness of tax avoidance, instead it has the effect of potentially trying to influence any 
assessment of its tax practice. Vodafone plc describes its tax policy as “straight forward” and can be 
interpreted as implying a passive approach to corporate taxation (see Quote 4, Table 2). This implied 
absence of tax avoidance suggests an influencing strategy. In 2010 Barclays plc and Diageo plc were 
both explicit in the influence of tax consequences on their decision making (see Quotes 5 and 6, Table 
2,  respectively). Both disclosures challenge the premise that companies should not practice tax 
avoidance. In all cases implicit philosophy disclosures were made in mandatory disclosures relating to 
either audit firm provided services,150 (see Quote 7, Table 2) or discussion of forecast amounts (see 
Quote 8, Table 2) which included the term “tax planning”. The references to tax planning suggest an 
active tax policy which presumably aims to influence the level of resulting taxation which could be 
described as a practice consistent with tax avoidance. 
Mandatory risk management disclosures can be used by managers to emphasise appropriate 
conduct involving taxation. Internal and external procedures can be emphasised, for example, 
directors’ assessment of tax risks and appropriate reporting to tax administrations respectively. Two 
examples are given below of influencing disclosures. Lloyds plc explains the nature of risk associated 
with tax reporting and changing tax rates (see Quote 9, Table 2). While the disclosure does not 
explain the strategy underlying the company’s tax policy and the nature of the transactions subject to 
reporting, the awareness of the risks and related penalties implies appropriate external conduct as a 
consequence. In contrast the Barclays plc risk statement is more direct as it states the company is 
“responsible” in the management and control of its tax affairs and implies appropriate internal 
conduct (see Quote 10, Table 2).  The use of the word “responsible” can be taken as an attempt to 
influence an assessment of the company’s approach to taxation. The reference to transparency is 
unclear . Finally the authors consider contribution disclosures. The authors classify any disclosures 
that refer to either specific amounts of taxation paid by the company or a general statement to the 
effect that the activities generate tax revenues as an influencing contribution. Two examples are given 
in Quotes 11 and 12, Table 2,  for Diageo plc and Barclays plc  respectively.151   
 
Results 
Table 3 summarises the occurrence of disclosures in the AR and CSRRs under the four 
themes: 1. explicit philosophy; 2. implicit philosophy; 3. conduct; and 4. contribution in panels A, B, 
C and D respectively.   
 
                                                          
150
 A possible indication of the sensitivity of such disclosures is given in one example. In each year Tesco plc 
disclosed in a note to directors’ remuneration that Deloitte & Touche LLP had advised the company on 
remuneration policies as well as providing a range of other advisory services. In all years these other advisory 
services included “corporate tax planning” except in 2006 when the noun “planning” was absent only to be 
restored in the following years. 
151
 Arguably disclosures that refer to taxes paid other than corporate income taxes could be classified as 
deflecting. However, as stated above, the authors do not attempt to draw a distinction between influencing and 
deflecting strategies.  
  
Table 3: incidence  of AR and CSRR  tax disclosures by  theme 




04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 13–14 14–15  
ARs            
Diageo             
HSBC         Co* Co*  
Tesco            
Vodafone       In Ch Ch Ch Ch In 
Barclays      Co  Ch Co*  Co*   
Lloyds           Co* 
RBS     In In      
CSRR            
Diageo   Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch  Ch De Ch   
HSBC   Ch      Co* Co  
Tesco            
Vodafone Ch Ch Inf Ch In Ch Ch   Ch In Co Ch In Co Ch In Co 
Barclays        Co* Co* Co*  
Lloyds         Co* Co* Co* 
RBS         Co*  Co* Co* 
  
No of companies 
disclosing 
2 2 3 2 3 4 3 2 6 6 3 
Where Ch = Challenging; Co = Conforming; and In = Influencing and * = Disclosure represents an explicit reference to complying with “Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks”. 
 
  
Table 3: continued: incidence of AR and CSRR tax disclosures by theme 
Panel B:  philosophy—implicit 
 
Number of discl
the period 2004– — –
In AR/CSRR 
 
04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 13–14 14–15  
ARs             
Diageo  Ch Ch Ch  Ch  Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch 11 
HSBC Ch Ch   Ch  Ch  Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch 9 
Tesco Ch   Ch Ch  Ch  Ch Ch  Ch Ch Ch Ch 10 
Vodafone Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch 11 
Barclays Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch  Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch 11 
Lloyds            0 
RBS            0 
CSRR             
Diageo           Ch   1 
HSBC   Ch          1 
Tesco            0 
Vodafone            0 
Barclays         Ch Ch  2 
Lloyds             0 
RBS         Co   1 
  
No of companies 
disclosing 
5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 5 5  




Table 3: continued: incidence of AR and CSRR tax disclosures by theme 
Panel C:  Internal Conduct (IC) and External Conduct (EC) Number of disclosures by company ov
2004–05—2014–15 
IC EC IC: AR & CSRR
ARs 04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 13–14 14–15    
Diageo        IC IC IC IC IC 5  7 
            0  
HSBC  IC IC   IC IC IC IC IC IC 8  8 
            0  
Tesco      IC   IC   2  2 
            0  
Vodafone    IC  IC IC IC  IC  IC  IC  7  18 
       EC EC EC EC  4  
Barclays IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC  IC IC  IC 11  15 
  EC EC EC EC EC EC  EC EC  8  
Lloyds    IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC 8  10 
          EC  1  
RBS        IC  IC IC 3  3 
        EC    1  
CSRR  
Diageo          IC IC  2   
EC EC EC EC EC EC EC  EC  EC  9 
HSBC            0  
  EC       EC   2 
  
Tesco            0  
  EC EC         2 
Vodafone IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC IC 11  
 EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC EC  10 
Barclays      IC  IC IC IC  4  
       EC EC EC   3 
Lloyds          IC IC 2  
        EC  EC  2 
RBS            0  
      EC EC EC EC EC  5 
No of IC disclosing 
companies 
2 3 3 3 3 5 5 6 6 6 6  
No of EC disclosing 
companies 
1 2 5 4 3 3 4 3 5 4 5  
No of companies 
disclosing IC and/or EC 













Table 3: continued: incidence of AR and CSRR tax disclosures by theme 
Panel D:  contribution 
 
Number of discl




04–05 05–06 06–07 07–08 08–09 09–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 13–14 14–15  
ARs             
Diageo             5 
HSBC            6 
Tesco            1 
Vodafone            5 
Barclays            5 
Lloyds            5 
RBS            7 
CSRR      
Diageo              11 
HSBC            11 
Tesco            3 
Vodafone            11 
Barclays            9 
Lloyds            8 
RBS            7 
  
No of companies 
disclosing 




Panel A of Table 3 reveals an increase in the number of explicit philosophy statements over time. Initially such 
disclosures were only made in CSRRs but over time disclosures were also made in the ARs, though companies disclosing 
in the ARs were always in a minority. Having initiated a policy of disclosure there were several instances where the 
policy was reversed, for example, Diageo plc having consistently made a disclosure in its CSRRs, did not make one in 
2011–2012 only to reinstate a policy of disclosure the following year. Barclays plc changed its policy on disclosing in its 
ARs four times in the seven year period 2008–2009 to 2013–2014. HSBC plc and RBS plc also reversed decisions to 
initiate disclosure. Only Tesco plc adopted a consistent policy throughout the 11 year sample period albeit a policy of 
non-disclosure. 2012–2013 was the first year in which a company disclosed in both its CSRR and ARs, previously 
disclosure had been restricted to one or other of these two documents. A significant factor behind the increase in 
disclosures from 2010–2011 to 2013–2014 was companies disclosing their acceptance of The Code.  In the main, 
disclosures were made in the companies’ CSRRs although, with the exception of RBS plc, the other banks referred to The 
Code in their ARs in at least one year. Post 2013–2014 only Lloyds plc and RBS plc made any reference to The Code 
either in their ARs or CSRRs.152  Surprisingly the banks are not highlighting their participation in The Code as a way of 
sending “a reassuring message” to the public.153 
In terms of the strategy or content of the disclosures, Diageo plc and Vodafone plc were the only two companies 
disclosing at the start of the sample period 2004–2005 and in 2005–2006, both made disclosures challenging any 
condemnation of tax avoidance. At the start of the sample period the initial response in general therefore was either to 
ignore or not recognise tax avoidance as a potential threat to companies’ legitimacy. However by the end of the period in 
2014–2015 a wider range of disclosures are observed including: “Challenging” (Vodafone plc), “Conforming” (Vodafone 
plc, Lloyds plc and RBS plc) and “Influencing” (Vodafone plc). Although in the majority of instances companies adopted 
a single strategy for example, “Challenge”, “Conform” or “Influence” in any one year, Vodafone plc and Barclays plc 
adopted mixed strategies in some years, for example Vodafone plc in 2014–2015 and Barclays plc in 2010–2012. 
Variation in strategy is observable within some companies over time. Barclays plc is one example. Having disclosed in 
2009–2010 that its “responsibilities to stakeholders” including “Pay our fair share of taxes” (see Quote 1) in 2010–2011 
the primacy of shareholders’ interests was emphasised. Barclays plc announced the group’s strategy was to “maximise 
returns for shareholders” (see Quote 5). These two disclosures represent a change from a conformatory position to one of 
challenging. Vodafone plc and Diageo plc are two other examples of companies which changed strategy over time.  
The implicit philosophy disclosures are more stable in terms of deciding to make a disclosure and the strategy 
adopted (see Table 3, panel B). Diageo plc,154 Vodafone plc and Barclays plc made Challenging disclosures in their ARs 
each year followed by Tesco plc which disclosed in all but one year. Conversely, Lloyds plc did not disclose in any year 
and RBS plc only made a disclosure in one year. Again, in contrast to explicit philosophy disclosures, implicit disclosures 
were in the vast majority of cases made in companies’ ARs and when they were made in CSRRs, the practice was short 
lived for example, Barclays plc and RBS plc. Although the disclosures were in general contained in mandatory 
disclosures on non-audit fees and risk, management companies adopted distinct disclosure patterns. Lloyds plc and RBS 
plc made no disclosures with the exception of RBS plc in 2012–2013 whereas the remaining companies made disclosures 
in almost every year. The vast majority of disclosures were made in the ARs reflecting the influence of mandatory 
disclosure requirements. The strategies adopted were overwhelming ones of Challenging with only one instance of an 
alternate strategy being adopted by RBS plc’s Conformatory disclosure in 2012–2013. 
The occurrences of Internal Conduct (IC) and External Conduct (EC) disclosures are shown in panel C of Table 3. 
The bottom three rows of the panel record a general increase in the number of companies making disclosures from three 
in 2004–2005 to a peak of seven in 2012–2013. The increase is reflected in both the number of IC and EC disclosures. 
Although EC disclosures were initiated in CSRRs and remained more prevalent in CSRRs, over time more companies 
began to make these disclosures in their ARs. The converse is the case for IC disclosures. Across the seven companies 
there is wide variation in the frequency of disclosures. Vodafone plc (via CSRRs) and Barclays plc (via ARs) made IC 
disclosures each year. These two companies were also the most frequent in making EC disclosures in all but one and two 
years respectively, Vodafone plc (via CSRRs) and Barclays plc (via ARs).155 Tesco plc was the least frequent discloser 
                                                          
152
 “Tesco Bank” (Tesco Personal Finance plc) is a signatory to The Code. No reference is made to The Code in any of Tesco plc’s 
ARs or CSRRs.  
153
 R. Collier, “Intentions, Banks, Politics and the Law: The UK Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks” [2014] BTR 478. 
154
 Diageo plc’s disclosure related to taxation of beverages. “The group devotes resources to encouraging the equitable taxation 
treatment of all beverage alcohol categories and to reducing government-imposed barriers to fair trading.” Source: Business 
description, Regulations and taxes, page 29, Diageo Annual Report 2010 and Business description, community Regulations and taxes, 
page 35, Diageo Annual Report 2011. While not relating to corporate taxation it indicates that the company is not a “passive” 
taxpayer. 
155
 Another example from Barclays plc of what appears to be a change in underlying motivation concerns its conduct themed 
disclosures. From 2005 onwards in a discussion of risk management the company made a detailed tax risk disclosure which included 
  
with only two EC and two IC disclosures in the entire 11 year period. There are several instances of companies changing 
the decision to disclose. HBSC plc first disclosed (IC) in 2005–2006, the second year of the sample period, but ceased 
after the following year—a decision it then reversed in 2009–2010. Tesco plc’s only two IC disclosures were not 
consecutive, occurring in 2009–2010 and 2012–2013. Diageo plc, Lloyds plc and RBS plc exhibit similar changes in 
disclosure practice. 
The trend with contribution disclosures shows initially the majority of companies disclosing in their CSRRs with 
a move over time to also disclosing in their ARs. By the end of the sample period all seven companies disclosed in both 
their ARs and CSRRs by comparison with the start of the period in 2004–2005 when only one company disclosed in its 
AR (RBS plc) and four companies made CSRRs disclosures (Diageo plc, HSBC plc, Tesco plc and Vodafone plc). 
Diageo plc, HSBC plc and Vodafone plc were consistent in disclosing in each year via their CSRRs. Tesco plc was 
consistent in not making AR based disclosures until the final year. Within the remaining companies significant variation 
in disclosure policy can be observed with Vodafone plc, Lloyds plc and RBS plc each changing practice at least twice in 
the sample period.  
There is support for all five propositions. First, the general increase in tax related disclosures implies a realisation 
that criticism of tax avoidance activities may have the potential to threaten companies’ legitimacy. Secondly, the variation 
between companies in whether or not to make a disclosure supports the second proposition that there is a lack of 
consensus amongst the companies as to what is the appropriate disclosure response or non-response. Thirdly, the 
observed lack of consistency on the part of some companies suggests an uncertainty on the part of managers of individual 
companies as to what is the appropriate response which has continued over time despite increasing public unease. 
Fourthly, uncertainty is not restricted to the decision whether or not to make a disclosure as the variation in strategy 
adopted by individual companies’ shows. Fifthly, this uncertainty persists over time within individual companies.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Having until recently been generally overlooked in the CSR literature156  the preceding analysis shows that 
managers appear to perceive tax avoidance as an emerging threat to legitimacy. While managers generally appear to be 
wary of responding to criticism of tax avoidance, which in turn is arguably consistent with a fear of legitimising 
criticism,157 the authors have found an increase in thematic disclosures over the 11 year period examined. This increase is 
consistent with the general observation that managers appear to perceive criticism of involvement in tax avoidance as 
legitimacy threatening. However, behind this general observation there is wide variation both between companies and 
within companies over time.  
Managers in general did not directly explain taxation policies. Explicit philosophy disclosures increased, though 
by the end of the period only two companies made disclosures in their ARs. In CSRRs there were greater disclosures with 
at one stage, 2012–2013 and 2013–2014, six of the seven companies’ disclosed before a falloff in numbers in 2014–2015. 
This lack of direct explicit response is unlikely to result from a fear of disclosing strategically important information to 
tax administrations or competitors. More likely, uncertainty over the philosophical and legal interpretation and status of 
tax avoidance adds to the apparent unwillingness of managers to make disclosures or to engage in a debate by challenging 
the criticism or confirming their acceptance of that criticism. Instead the favoured response was an appeal to procedural 
and consequential legitimacy through conduct and contribution themed disclosures. In 2004–2005 there was only one 
instance of a company making a conduct disclosure in its AR and two cases of a CSRR disclosure. By 2014–2015, with 
the exception of Tesco plc, all the companies made a conduct disclosure in both their ARs and CSRRs. In 2014–2015 for 
the first time all companies made a contribution disclosure in both the AR and CSRRs, a year in which Tesco plc made its 
first contribution disclosure in an AR. 
Companies exhibit distinctive behaviour. The four banks adopted different responses. Barclays plc and HSBC plc 
generally increased their frequency of disclosures, RBS plc maintained a relatively low level of disclosures throughout 
and Barclays plc had several changes of practice. Even within a single industry, there is uncertainty among managers in 
identifying the appropriate legitimising. One could expect Tesco plc to be the most responsive or sensitive of the 
companies examined because of its higher public visibility resulting from it being a retail business158 and its broad 
geographical presence in the UK. Surprisingly, the company was the least frequent discloser in all four themes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
the statement “the tax risks of proposed transactions or new areas of business are fully considered before proceeding” (see for 
example, “Risk management and governance, taxation risk” Barclays plc Annual Report 2009, 85).  However, in 2010 the text was 
not included in the equivalent note.  
156
 See Dowling, above fn.15; see Sikka, above fn.76; and see Ylönen and Laine, above fn.77. 
157
 See Benoit, above fn.35. 
158
 See Hanlon and Slemrod, above fn.24. 
  
The publication of separate ARs and CSRRs by companies is a recognition by companies that they have multiple 
stakeholders whose information needs are not met by a single report.159 The observed pattern of philosophy disclosures 
originating in CSRRs before being replaced in subsequent years by disclosures in the AR could suggest the information 
needs of the various stakeholder groups changed over the period. Alternatively, in the earlier years managers may have 
failed to identify the sources of the criticism and their information needs. The apparent reluctance to initially disclose via 
ARs may have been a deliberate act arising from a fear of legitimising the criticism through the use of the primary 
reporting medium.160 The subsequent fall in the use of CSRRs as a place of disclosure may represent a belated realisation 
of changing attitudes to taxation avoidance within society.   
The implication consequent upon of the authors’ findings is that if greater disclosure about companies’ tax 
decisions is deemed necessary by society then society cannot rely on voluntary disclosure. Even in the presence of 
company specific criticism managers are generally reluctant to voluntarily explain the basis of their decisions. Further, the 
variation in disclosure behaviour suggests that a lack of consistency between companies’ disclosures would result from 
such disclosure being on a voluntary basis. From a tax enforcement perspective tax administrations cannot always rely on 
managers’ attitudes to moderate tax behaviour. The observed variation both between companies and within companies 
could suggest a lack of consensus as regards managers’ attitudes to tax avoidance. Perhaps if society wishes to change 
corporate behaviour it should do so via changes in legislation aimed at reducing the opportunity and benefits of tax 
avoidance rather than attempting to use increased disclosure as a means of changing managers’ behaviour. 
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 C. de Villiers and C.J. van Staden, “Where firms choose to disclose voluntary environmental information” (2011) 30(6) Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 504. 
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 See Suchman, above fn.41. 
